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Introduction : 
Needless to say， Japanese case of tripartism named Sanrokon or 
the Round Table Conference on Industry and Labor (1970-the pres・
It might be even described， by ent) can be a distinctive existence. 
some observers， as paradoxical， therefore， "unique" institutional 
arrangement especially when it is compared to those of West Eur. 
For instance， followings are some evidences for its opean countries. 
distinctiveness. 
1) It started in 1970 under the conservative LDP one-party domi. 
nance (1955-93)， not under the social democratic government. 2) The 
labor was less integrated and concentrated in comparison to Eur. 
opean countries: being organised by four national centers， about two 
hundred industrial confederations and more than 60 thousand enter-
?????
3) Sanrokon has been held on an "informal" basis (at pnse umons. 
least non-statutory， no law-base) and in a very low key. It seems 
however， that it has been functioning well. 4) It seems that the roles 
of key figures were very crucial， such as those of Y oshiji Miyァatawho 
was a representative of labor circ1es， Takeo Fukuda of political ones 
5) Thus， N akayama of academic ones. and particularly Ichiro 
political "timing" and stratagems as well as shared feeling of引crisis"
among the key figures were al indespensable factors to estab1ish 
Sanrokon and to make it effective to go through a series of crises in 
the mid-1970's. 
A: Background Situation 
As can be seen c1early in the three graphs concerning the rate of 
Shunto (Spring Offensive or Spring Wage N egotiation Round starting 
1955) wage increase and the real GNP growth rate (Figure 1)， the 
consumer prices between 1956 and 1987 (Figure 2)， and labor disputes 
accompanied by industrial actions between 1956 and 1987 (Figure 3)， 
J apanese industrial relations have changed drastically by nature 
since around the mid-1970s (Takanashi et al 1989， Figures are from 
The wage increase has Kuwahara 1989). Takanashi et al 1989. 
become reasonable and adequate corresponding to its national eco-
nomic growth and productivity growth. This has been accompanied 
by a drastic dec1ine in the number of severe disputes in the industrial 
These peaceful industrial relations smoothed and place (Figure 3). ?????
even promoted the flexible structural transformation of J apanese 
industries in the era of代oilshocks" in the 1970's and of the stronger 
yen in the 1980's. 
How could such a刊positiveshift" be obtained in Japan during the 
turbulent period in the mid-1970's， despite the historical confronta‘ 
tion between Sohyo (GCTU， the General Council of Trade Unions in 
Figure 1. Real GNP Growth Rate and Rate of Shunto Wage 
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]apan， 1950-1989) and the business-conservative government bloc in 
the 1950's and 1960's， (Stockwin， 1975) as well as the panic immediate-
ly after the first oil shocks in the end of 1973 ? 
These puzzles have been discussed under the theoretical context 
Figure 2. Rate of Change in Consumer Prices and Rate of 
Shunto Wage Increase 
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of neo-corporatism in the advanced countries (Inagami et a1. 1994， 
especially Shimodaira's， Oumi's and Tsujinaka's artic1es included in 
Inagami et al. 1994). How did ]apan manage to perform exception-
ally well in terms of its industrial peace， low unemployment rates， 
Figure 3掴 Labor Disputes Accompanied by Industrial 
Actions， Number of Employees Involved and 
Working Days Lost 
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steady growth rates and governability in general in comparison to the 
Especially other advanced countries in the late 1970's and 1980's? 
why was it so successful in adjusting itself to newly emerged insecure 
?????
situations after the end of Bretton W oods System， and after the oil 
shocks as well? In this context， there should be some代organizational
If consultative mechanism" to mediate among various new actors. 
so， itis to bring about reasonable and adequate solutions to them， 
The question can be partially answered here by focusing on the 
tripartite body named Sanrokon. 
Let me describe briefly some of the preceding conditions and 
contexts in ]apan after World war I (Tsujinaka 1994， and 1993. 
As for political climate surrounding the industrial Nakamura 1988). 
1n this relations， itwas basically colored by the cold-war effect. 
context， ]apanese industrial relations and labor policies were not 
particularly different from those of other Western industrialized 
countries， which means that it was not so peaceful even worse in the 
industrial relations at least until 19601• 1n addition， generally speak島
ing， the conservative party， named Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
was neither friendly nor sympathetic. It was rather antagonistic 
toward labor. 
The labor movement was led by GCTU， whose major forces 
came from the public sector labor， and which was strongly allied with 
the ] apan Socialist Party (1945-， reunited in 1955); its affiliated mass 
democratic movement promoted anti-war policies and conservation 
of the democratic Constitution， and generally held a socialist-sympa-
Sohyo (GCTU)'s leadership was remote from the thetic ideology. 
problems of the private sector union leaders， who had to cope with 
rapid change in employment conditions in terms of "rationalization" 
(modernization) of companies and establishments in the period of 
??
?
? ?
high economic growth. Sohyo (GCTU)'s leadership was prone to the 
political movement and anti-government activity， because it was 
based on labor of the public sector whose strike right had been taken 
Recovering those labor rights was major target away in the 1950's. 
for them and， todo so， they needed more political power in the Diet目
Sohyo (GCTU) was not sensitive to the productivity， international 
competitiveness and rationalization (modernization) of industries and 
Therefore， the policy process in J apan was considerably compames. 
antagonistic between two Cold-War-like blocs， the LDP-Business 
bloc (and Agricultural Cooperatives in rural areas as a junior partner) 
and the JSP-GCTU Labor bloc. Stockwin (1975) characterized this 
situation as "Divided Politics in a Growth Economy" 
However， because of rapid expansion of the private sector and 
the affluence of each of the members which was brought about by the 
high economic growth， the private sector labor leaders， supported by 
the enterprise unions in Ieading industries， had become correspond-
Due to the logic of enterprise ingly powerful in the mid-1960's. 
unions， union leaders mutually share information and interests with 
They are also sensitive to the productivity and their companies. 
competitiveness of their company because of a direct correlation 
between wage hike and company performance. 
N akamura summarizes the situation of private union members 
as follows: first， in the enterprise， the work community is rather 
]apanese industrial relations were comparable in terms of labor dis-
pute to U. S. A.， U. K.， and France. The numbers of ]apanese labor 
dispute respectively in 1965， 1970 and 1975 were 1542， 2260 and 3391 ; 
1 
those of U. S. A were 268， 381 and 235; those of U. K. wer巴2354，3906
and 2282; those of France were 1674， 3942， and 3888. The numbers of 
labor 10ss days per 10 employεes in Japan in 1965， 1970 and 1975 were 
? ? ? ? ?
?
2.0， 1.2， and 2.2; those of U. S圃A.w己re2ふ7.4，and 2.3; those of U. K. 
were 1.2， 4.8， and 2.7; those of France were 0.7， 1.， and 2.2. 
Germany was quieter and Italy was more frequent. (Data are from 
West 
Nihon Seisansei Honbu， 1988， 1993). 
homogeneous than heterogeneous and class-oriented in nature; sec. 
ond， Japanese workers seem to have strong concerns for the employ司
ment stability and performance of the enterprises which they work 
for; third， a blooming success of the trade unionism and realism was 
brought about in big business enterprises， because of their catching 
up with the wage standerd of the Western level during the high 
economic growth period (N akamura 1988: 52-53). 
Here it should be confirmed some of the characteristics of 
enterprise union and its corollay， because they are most unique 
organizational features of Japanese union， strikingly distinctive from 
those of other Western countries. The enterprise union is organized 
by each individual enterprise and company as a unit. 1n contempo陶
rary Japan， 91. 3 percent employees out of total unionized employees 
and 93. 4 percent unions are set up in 1991 led by the enterprise 
unionism2 • Their membership is limited to its regular employees. 
There is a union shop agreement between the enterprise union and 
management. They have complete independence of hundling budget 
and personnel affairs from upper level unions as well as their affliat. 
ed company. Collective bargaining is set at the establishment and 
company level， not at the industrial and national level. 
四
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2 The proportion of the enterprise unions in the union sector has been 八一
increasing: ln 1954: 76.6% union members and 81.8% unions were 
organized by the principle; in 1964， 84.6% and 93.6% ; in1975， 82.5% 
and 93.6% ; in1991， 91.3% and 93.4 r巴spectively. (Nihon Seisansei 
Honbu， 1993: 164 based on Rodokum必iKiso Chosa: (Labor Union 
Fundamental Survey) by Ministry of Labor， ]apan) 
1n addition， being based on the trusty relations fostered by the 
enterprise unions and their management employers， a variety of 
consultation and communication matters are proceeded through a 
joint consultation body， which prevailed in the 1960s and 70s inside of 
the majority of companies (in 1977， 70.8% out of total companies and 
92.8% out of a total of big companies with 5000 or more employees) 
(1nagami 1988). 
This kind of cooperative consultation was reached in many 
major industries in the late 1960s and 1970s， such as textiles， shipping， 
cement， coal mining， automobile， electric power， ship building， steel， 
The productivity electric machines， hotels， fine machine and etc. 
movement strongly promoted this tendency with the support of 
enterprise union leaders in the private sector (Fujita 1981). 
1n addition to the existence of enterprise union and related 
consultative mechanism， there has been a remarkable movement 
overarching both business and labor sectors focusing on productivity 
The J apan Productivity Center was estab!ished with lmprovement. 
the strong support of the US government to improve productivity of 
J apanese industries in 1955. It was the starting point for the move-
ment and it rapidly spread over the prかatesector in the 1960's not 
only by employers but also by big enterprises' labor union leaders. 
The movement emphasized three basic principles: improvement of 
??????
productivity， labor-management consultation and cooperation， fair 
distribution of the fruits of economic growth among management， 
labor and consumers. 1n this regard， Sohyo (GCTU) solely declined 
to participate in the movement， while other major enterprise unions 
in the private sector agreed to do so (Nakamura 1988: 12-15). 
Finally we have to touch upon the famous Shunto， or Spring 
Offensive (or more precisely， I prefer to use the spring wage negotia“ 
tion round， instead) movement， which is the most important charac-
teristic of ]apanese labor-related activity. This movement was 
invented to overcome a dilemma between the terribly decentralized 
structure stemmed from the enterprise unionism and the commonly 
shared demand for the wage-raise in proportion to the economic 
(productivity) growth. 
As a mechanism of wage determination， Shunto has p凶1<叫lり3
roles: f白irもsはt，the raising or at least the stabilization of wage levels， 
and second， the standardization of wages. Takanashi describes its 
characteristics as follows : 
In the early years of Shunto real wage increases were less than the 
growth rate of real GNP per capita and the share of labor in national 
income was around 50 perceぽ. How巴verafter Shunto became broadly 
established， the real wage incr日asεexceededreal GNP growth per capita， 
and eventually the share of labor increased. (Takanashi巴ta1. 1989: 13) 
Changes in the Pattern Setter: 
During the late fifties and early sixti巴s，the Shunto rate t巴ndedto be s日t
either by unions in the chemicals industry， private railways or the public 
enterprises. In the late sixties and early，seventies this role was more or less 
taken over by unions in iron and stee1. More re目的 thefour rnetals 宅
industries under the IMF-]C have come to the fore. 
The rnain factor behind th巴sechanges has been structural change in 
the ]apanese econorny. During the late fifties and early sixties the weight 
of the public sector in the postwar economy was stil1 large. Dependence on 
international trade was srnall， since its econorny was led by the domestic 
demand. Thus， itwas inevitable for the industry such as private railways 
-L. 
ノ、
which r巴flectedonly domestic trends to come to perform as a pattern 
setter. 
With the Iib巴ralizationof trade and intensified competition of invest-
ing in plants and equipments in the early 1960s， industries sl1ch as iron and 
steel and shipbuilding with their huge巴conomiesof scale began to blaze for 
Then the development of exports and efforts to remain greater rol巴s.
competitive reinforced iron and steel's positions且sa pattern setter. 
1n addition iron and steel was a particularly stable industry in the 
period of high economic growth as its output was absorbed by the broad 
spectrum of its customer industries. 
When the economy became exporHed in the late 1970s， typicalleading 
exporters such as the shipbuilders and manufacturers of automobiles and 
el日ctricalappliances also became patterロsettersalongside of iron and 
steel. (Takanshi et al. 1自89:15) 
N eedless to say， along with the this kind of Shunto logic prevaiIs， 
relative power of the private labor unions， especially those of steel 
and other metal and manufacturing industries became strengthened 
This should be noted because one in the sector through the 1960's. 
key actor of the Sanrokon drama， Y oshiji Miyata is from this 
particular sector's labor union. 
The private union leaders formed， as its national central organi-
zation， Domei or the Japanese Confederation of Labor， against Sohyo 
Furthermore， significantly the most powerful metal-and (GCTU). 
??????
machine-related industries' leaders formed the International Metal-
worker's Federation-Japan Council (IMF-JC) in 1964， the same year 
Regardless of their affiliation to 
any of the four national organizations; Sohyo (GCTU)， Domei (JCL)， 
of the foundation of Domei (JCL). 
Churitsu and Shinsanbetsu， they joined in 1孔IIF-JC.
ln the private sector， Domei (JCL)'s membership as well as that 
of 1MF -JC outstripped that of advance Sohyo (GCTU) in the late 
1960s. This change in the balance of power allowed union leaders to 
set out the reunification movement of 4 different national centers in 
1967 (Tsujinaka 1994). 
It was this timing that the Sanrokon was established by the 
Ministry of Labor. 
B: Sanrokon: Its Status 
Sanrokon was created in January 1970 as a non日statutorycon. 
sultative committee to give advice to the Minister of Labor (Please 
1n its outline， itclaimed that its see table 1 ; Outline of Sanrokon). 
purpose is "to establish a forum of supremely wise people regarding 
industry labor policy which aims at exchanging of views from wide 
range of aspects， asking cooperation of them， and deepening mutual 
understanding. lt further claimed that the time had come to create 
it， inconsidering the forthcoming changes in the overall economy and 
industrial structure that accompany the development of the J apanese 
economy. lt was really a brilliant prediction of such a drastic change 
(Ministry of Labor 1993). ??????
Its status is a "non-staturory" cons1l1tative committee. ln terms 
of legal status， itis different from its proto type in West Germany， 
the Economic Consultation Committee (the Five Wisemen Commit. 
tee， consisting of five scholars， 1963-) and Cooperative Action Com. 
mission (1967-). ln other countries， just as in the same way， a more 
-or-less formal status is attached to the consultative bodies such as 
四
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National Economic Development Council in UK， Labor Foundation in 
Netherlands， both of them based on particular law， and the LO~SAF 
Consultation in Sweden based on the central labor-匂management
agreement (Fujita 1981). 
Table 1 Outline of Sanrokon (The Round Table Confer-
ence on Industry and Labor): January 1970 
お1inistryof Labor (l¥iIinistry of Labor 1993: 43) 
1. 1n Prospect 
]apanese e吃onomymay well experience the forthcoming changes of 
nature in the 田 onomyand industrial structure. Therモfore，top 
leaders from government. business， labor， and academia should estab-
lish a forum of“supremely wise people" regarding industry labor 
policies which aims at exchanging of views from wide range of 
aspects， asking cooperation among them， and deepening mutual 
understanding. 
2. Characteristics and Contents 
1) Minister of Labor entrusts from business， labor， and academia 
with being members. As occasion demands， he 01' she convene a 
forum to ask th巴iropinion on related policy matters. (Ther巴forε
state administrative organization law Article 8 does not apply to 
this forum.) 
2) The number of the members is about 25. (It is not tripartite 
structure.) 
3) Chair should be elected by the members. 
3. Proceeding 
1) General labor problem and related industry problem should be 
discussed. 
2) Depending upon its policy matters， itcan ask related minister to 
join the talk 
3) If necessary， itcan provide to special committee member to 
engage in the specific item. 
4) It guarantees to exchange views fr配 lyand does not open to the 
public 
Sanrokon is also different from Shingikai， or a formal con-
sultative committee based on the State Administration Organization 
There are 212 Shingikais in 1995 in Japan， some of Law in Japan_ 
which have a structure of tripartite body and most of which are 
designed to answer the government request for formal authoritative 
advice. Besides， there is a category of non-statutory advisory com-
mittees which is formed on an ad hoc needs basis at various levels 
from the Prime Minister to the director-general (Tsujinaka 1985). 
They generally last 1 to 2 years depending on its dut}アtomake some 
Ainong Shingikais and non←statutory advisory advisory reports. 
committees， some of them consist of high-grade top leaders like 
ぬnrokon，but their function is generalIy to answer government 
requests， different from the purely consultative role of Sanrol?on 
A History: Sanrokon， 1970-the present 1 
As the ILO emphasized the significance of tripartite cooperation3 
and labor-management consultation at the industrial and national 
When the level at every available opportunity especially since 1960. 
ILO adopted the Consultation Recommendation (No. 113) (Trebilcock 
et al. 1994: 5)， the Japanese government tried to set up regular ??????
consultation with labor national centers under the Ikeda cabinet. It 
could not last long in the mid-1960s， however， because of persistent 
confrontation and distrust among labor towards the conservative 
government regarding the problem of civil servants' and public sector 
workers' right to strike. 
(Regarding description of history， the author relied on various news 
papers' articles and interviews to the key persons in charge of 
Sanrokon. Interviews were conducted in J anuary 19954)). 
1-1: A Difficult Delivery in Establishment of Sanrokon 
As for the case of Sanrokon， the Ministry of Labor (MOL) started 
Because of the to examine the prospects in the summer of 1966. 
success of the high economic growth policy and moderation in con司
frontation of the labor movement， MOL， especially its central core 
bureau， the Bureau of Labor Relations， ironically， needed a new 
It raison de etre to compensate for its erosion of significance. 
considered the introduction of an equivalent to the German Wisemen 
Committee in Japan in the form of a quasi-tripartite body in order to 
discuss and to consult the issue of wages， settlement economic 
development and the property-making system for workers (Enjoji et 
al 1981: 21). 
Trebilcook expresses this as follows:“Tripartite cooperation is an 
ideological thread that has run though the International labor organi. 
zation (ILO) from its founding in 1919 to contemporary statements by 
3 
its international and regional conf，巴rences，its Governing Body and its 
Director-General." (1994: 5) 
Interviewees are Masao Matsunaga (1995， 1， 19at Nihon Club， Tokyo) 
Yoshiji Miyata (1995， 1， 19and 1， 23at Matsushita Seikei-Jyuku Tokyo 
Office)， Kunihil王oDosho (1995， 1， 24 at Zaikei Kinyu KK). 
4 
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Mr. Matsunaga (born in 1918) was Director-General of Labor Rela. 
tions (November 1966-0ctober 1970) and Administrative Vice-Minis-
ter of Labor (October 1970-August 1973). 
Mr. Miyata (born in 1924) was Deputy General Director of Japanese 
It was felt that this system should be a more informal or quasi 
-formal system than those of other countries. It was partly because 
the cabinet as well as business circle preferred to emphasize the tenet 
of liberal enterprise capitalism as opposed to the social democratic 
Beside the J apanese welfare capitalism typically professed in UK. 
cabinet and bureaucracy has gradually turned from the central 
bureaucracy-controlled system to the more de-centralized network 
-like system in the 1960s， people preferred the informal and informa-
tion-sharing networks and indirect guidance to formal and rigid 
system and direct control. 
The Minister of Labor at that time， Kenzaburo HARA (1968， 11， 
30-1970.1， 13) was enthusiastic in introducing the tripartite consulta-
tion system. He was quite popular in the business community. Later 
Federation of Iron and Steal 羽Torkers' Union (JFISWU) in 1959， 
President of the JFISWU in 1968 (一1980)and the Chair of IMF -JC 
between 1973 and 1984. 
Mr. Dosho was Deputy Vice Minister for Administration of Labor 
(October 1970-January 1972)， Director-General of Labor Relations 
(July 1973-July 1975)噂 AdministrativeVice-Minister of Labor (July 
1975-December 1976)， and the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary (Decem- ??
?
? ? ?
ber 1976-December 1978). 
In addition， several intensive interviews were conducted to the 
officials currently in charge of Sanrokon， especially Hideo Sugawara， 
Director of Labor Relations Division and Kinya Shirakawa， Deputy 
Director of Labor Relations Division. 
AII interviews were coordinated by Mr. Hiroshi Yamashita， Vice 
-Director， ILO-Tokyo Office. I appreciate his cooperation very much. 
he became the chairperson of the House of Representatives. 
The Business community in ]apan consists of four major 
national organizations， Keidanren or Federation of Economic Organi-
zations， NiJ，keiren or the ]apan Federation of Emp!oyers' Associa命
tion. Nissho， or Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry， and 
Doyukai. Their attitude， especially Nikkeiren， which is specifically in 
charge of industrial and labor affairs among them， was very coopera-
tive in creating such an opportunity to talk frankly with and to 
persuade labor leaders (Enjoji at al 1981: 2. MOL 1993: 6) 
Before the establishment of Sanrokon， they had become gradu-
ally satisfied with having a consultative body in the industry level as 
well as at the company level. It was the national level that was 
needed to fi1l the gap between the management and labor leaders' 
opinion. Until the mid-1960's the Central Labor Relations Commis-
sion， a formal tripartite entity that examined a trade union's eligibil-
ity and cases of labor practices to check the coverage of the collec-
tive agreement， and to conciliate， mediate， or arbitrate labor dis時
putes， was also a very important place for knowing the real intention 
of labor， consulting the serious labor problem with labor leaders as 
well as persuading them. 1n effect it had remained， however， merely 
in name. lronically it was because of its success in consolidating the 
異laborur叩11伽
九e: serious debates than on unfair practices regarding problems between 
Q labor and management of the private railway industry， as well as 
wage l1egotiatiol1s (Enjoji et al 1981: 21-.2). 
II1 academia， by the same tokeJl， some of the labor problem 
specialists were worried about the situatioJl. Ichiro NAKA YAMN， 
the chair of the Central Labor Relations Commission and the Presi-
dent of J apan Labor Institute， was gravely concerned， and he became 
the most enthusiastic academic person in establishing Sanrokon， and 
was appointed the chair of it for first 10 years. 
The difficulties laid in the labor sector which had been divided 
into four competing or even mutually antagonistic national centers. 
Moreover， there is the inner sectoral difference between the private 
and public. The leader of labor in J apan， Sohyo (GCTU) and its 
public sector union leaders were very suspicious about such a con-
sultative meeting as a sort of trap. They felt that it was intention-
ally designed to promote co-optation and involvement by business， as 
a capitalist initiative to serve big business profiteering. They warned 
that this system would become an excuse to introduce the mandatory 
income policy which also would revive statist control over industrial 
relations. 
As mentioned， key figures in Domei (JCL) and IMF-JC were 
5 Ichiro NAKA YAMA， an economist， born in 1898 and died in 1980. 
Professor of Hitotsubashi University between 1937 and 1962 and the 
President of the university 1949-1956. Schumpeterian. Introduced first 
into ]apan “Modern Economics" concerning equilibrium theories. 
Established and became the chair of several prestigious academic 空
/、
associations. One of the brain trusts for prime minister Y oshida. }¥ 
Became a n巴utralside member of Central Labor Relations Commission 
since 1946 and the Chairperson between 1950 and 1960. Besides， he was 
very active as chairpersons of many important policy councils like 
Tax System Council， Central Minimum Wage Council and several 
price-problem-related study committees 
cooperative for担OLand business in establishing Sanrokon， espe. 
cially Y oshiji MIY A T A， who was the key person to form IMF -JC in 
1964 and had just become the chair of the central committee of 
Japanese Federation of 1ron and Steel Worker's Union in 1968. He 
had just completed their union's plan to acquire a wage level of 
European standards， and he was one of the key persons who promot田
ed the epoch-making company merger between Fuji Steel and 
Yahata Steel to give birth to the number one steel company of 
Nippon Steel in 1970. Under his leadership at Yahata Factory in the 
steel industry throughout the 1960's， he had estab!ished strong trust 
relationship with the president of the Yahata Steel later Nippon 
Steel， Y oshihiro Inayama. After forming the J apan Steel， and J apan 
Steel Labor Union for his home base， his power in the private sector 
labor became unassailable because of absolute importance of the 
relative weight of steel and iron industry in J apan's economy. 1n 
order to give substance to his intention more articulately， he needed 
a place for his voice heard， regarding governmental decision-making 
on national economic affairs and industrial affairs. 
Since 1967， the first reunification movement occurred in crosscut田
ting central organizations. Therefore there were a lot of opportu静
nities for the cooperative labor leaders to persuade other reluctant 
実leaders.
七
1n order to come to terms with Sohyo (GCTU) as well as business 
leaders who were worried about the introduction of the formal 
mandatory income policy， MOL promised not to use this place for 
introducing that policy in November 1969. At the final stage in 
December 1969， although appointment of members in the labor side 
was stil problematic， Akira IW AI， a prominent anti-establishment 
labor union leader in Sohyo (GCTU) gave the last post to lVIr. lVIiyata 
for him (Enjoji 1981・23). This is a kind of mystery， because al 
newspaper articles covering the topic before its establishment took it 
granted that lVIr. Iwai would be joining Sanrokon as a key figure. 
Without some deals behind the scenes， this might not have happened 
between two leaders in the differ官 ltconfrontational factions in the 
Sohyo (GCTU) labor movement. 
Consequently， Sanrokon was established in January 1970. 
1-2: Four Stages in the Development of Sanrokon 
Please see table 5 and table 7 (see also lVIOL 1993， Enjoji et al 
1981). 
The First Stage: 1st-45th meeting (1970， 1-1974， 11): An 
Approach Run Period (Sato Cabinet， Tanaka Cabinet) 
It was quite fortunate that Sanrokon was formed just before the 
Nixon Shocks along with the first high appreciation of the yen 
against the dollar since 1949 and with his approach to Communist 
China in 1971， and the subsequent drastic changes of the first oil 
shock and shift to floating system of foreign exchange in 1973. These 
shocks were intermed附 dby Sanrokon and 0伽 shock-absorbing 実
mechanism from the micro to macro-level to adjust the Japanese 会
economy and society to the new situations. They encouraged the 
structural change of Japanese industry (see next section， a case 
study). 
The members got into an imbroglio over how the wage hike 
四
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problem should be discussed. Especially because of a report issued by 
the Ohkawa committee in the J apan Economic Research Institute on 
wage and prices at the 11th meeting December 1970， plans for the 
12th Sanrokon meeting became entangled because it was to be an 
introduction of talks regarding income policy. The meetings were 
not held during the period between February and September in 1971 
However， at that time period， cooperative members as well as the 
MOL tried to reopen the meetings. 1n this rocky process， the charac-
ter of the system was becoming more clearly articulated by members 
before it restarted in October 1971. 
The topics varied and included some research-oriented reports 
on macro economics. Some of the labor side members tool王the
initiative in discussing the topic of Shunto， the spring wage negotia-
tion round， in the spring of 1972. During this process， there were 
three oversea inspection tours made by members of Sanrokon， which 
in the end facilitated mutual understanding， After the first oil shock， 
opportunistic price and wage hikes became the central topic. Chief 
of Economic planning Agency (EP A) as well as the Director-general 
of the Research Bureau of the agency aUended several times to 
explain the significance of the problems and government policy. 
Other minister， however， had not aUended yet. 
五 TheSecond stage: 46th-96th meeting (1974， 12--1980，5): A Full 
四一ScaleDevelopment 
(Miki Cabinet， Fukuda Cabinet， Ohira Cabinet) 
The cabinet itself emphasized the function of Sanrokon: consenω 
sus building and voluntary implementation of adequate wage raise 
without goverment intervention and control in the name of the in-
come policy. Especially Takeo FUKUDA took a streneous role in 
persuading Sanrokon members by attending 10 times as the vice 
-prime minister and Chief of EP A under M1K1 cabinet and three 
times as the Prime Minister. He was the first vice prime minister to 
attend it. Thereafter， Miki finally became the first prime minister to 
take part in the meeting. 
On the other hand， after the successful performance of the wage 
negotiation round， a labor side member， Mr. Miyata， demanded to be 
allowed to take more seats for labor in the advisory councils and 
other consultation committees (48th meeting) and further requested 
enlargement of the function of Sanrokon to discuss overall economic 
policies and to promote more attendance of related ministers (70th， 
71th). 1n addition， the issue of upgrading of Sanrokon was discussed 
several times (for instance， 63th， 64th). As can be seen in Table 5， 
Ministers of International Trade and Industry， Finance， Agriculture 
and other ministries started to attend the meeting in this period. This 
kind of custom is considered to be very exceptional in J apanese 
bureaucratic sectionalism. Since 1977， the items reaching consensus 
were to be formally reported in the cabinet meeting (Kakugi Hokoku， 
or formal cabinet reporting relations). 
The primary topics moved from the prices and wages to the 突
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employment， counter-measures against recession. 1n general，部会
claimed by Mr. Miyata， the topics shifted toward more and more its 五
macroeconomic policies. "Presentation of the current economic 
situation" by the director of EPA has become customary since the 
beginning of this period. Consequently， different from other periods， 
there appeared three formal reports and proposals on the prices 
between 1979 and 1981. Also， remarkably enough they have already 
gotten a head start on discussing the administrative reform， which 
wilI be major political agenda in the 1980's‘ (See table 6) 
The Third Stage: 97th-159th ll1eeting (1980， 7-1987， 11): A 
Stable and Generalized Period 
(Suzuki Cabinet， N akasone Cabinet) 
1n the period， Sanrokon was held quite regularly with increased 
attendance of various ministers and director-generals over time. 1n 
addition to the MOF， MITI， MOA， ministries and chiefs of foreign 
affairs， welfare and health， education and others started to send 
ministers there. The Chief of the Administrative Management 
Agency and chair of Rincho， Provisional Committee of Administra‘ 
tive Reform also appeared. The chair， Mr. Toshio DOKO himself had 
been a member of Sanrokon for 10 years. Later then on， the topics 
discussed there became hot political agenda in J apan. In this context 
Sanrokon became a comprehensive consultation body beyond the 
limit of labor and industrial problems. 
On the other hand， whether Sanrokon should be publisized was 
discussed， but they decided that it should be kept unpublicized (108th， 
契附h).Outside of Sanrok叫 thereappeared a variety of advisory 
: councils， including large councils like Rincho and statutory commit-
ハ teesto form new policies， But Sanrokon kept its informality as pure 
discussion style in nature. 
The Fourth Stage; 160th meeting-the present (1987， 12-); A Trans-
formation Period? 
(Takeshita， Uno， Kaihu， and Miyazawa LDP Cabinets， Hosokawa， 
Hata and Murayama Coalition Cabinets) 
The topics became more varied， inc1uding the environment， 
commuting， the consumer price gap between Japan and overseas etc. 
Influenced by the frequent cabinet shuffles， the number of meetings 
held generally decreased. After the end of LDP one party dominance 
in 1993， Sanrokon seems to be entering its transformation period. 
2 A Case Study: Sanrokon's Effective and Successful Consensus 
Building an Adequate Wage Hike in 1975 Wage N egotiation 
Round without a Formal Income Policy 
2-1: Background 
In this section， letus focus on a concrete case of successful and 
effective consensus building through Sanrol王on(Shinkawa 1984. 
Nikkeiren 1981. Inagami 1994， especially Oumi's article， 1994). It 
concerns the wage raise in the 1975 round just after the epoch 
-making increase in 1974， 32.9%. Although the increases generally 
fol1owed “me-too" price hikes and rapid GNP growth of preceding要
years， which can be seen in the two previous graphs (Figure 2， 3)， the -:
gap of increase rates between wages and prices， and between wage さ
and real GNP growth were increasing especially since 1970 round. 
This tendency was not only brought by labor offensives regard-
ing "1970 poIitical problems" (extension of US-J apan Mutual Secu-
rity Treaty， recovering Okinawa territory， university strikes， anti 
-Vietnam War etc.) but was also accelerated by several policy fail-
ures by LDP government. This included inappropriate policy mea-
sures against the dollar crisis， based on its bad-forecasts and wrong 
evaluations of the international currency system in 1971. Further-
more it was aggravated by the following inadequate economic， finan-
cial， and budgetary policies like enlarging economy policy by J apan 
Archipelago Re-developing Plan (Tanaka cabinet， 1972) and its 
related land policy. AIso， ittook a noncommittal and evasive posi-
tion to oil crisis or energy problem in 1973. 
As noted earlier， business as well as labor were repelling the 
formal income policy， although for different reasons. The govern-
ment was inclined not to take that policy， as shown in the Sumiya 
Report by the Prices/lncome/Productivity Committee in the Eco-
nomic Council of EP A in May 1972. There was the creed that the 
income policy should not be taken. 
But a 32.9% wage increase was quite shocking for business and 
government. The usually peaceful， and stable society turned into a 
panic at the end of 1973， because of an impending hyper inflation and 
lack of daily necessities such as toilet paper (the stocking-up-on 
toilet-paper panic: between November 16th and 20th， 1973). Then 
男Sanrok叫 generallyunknown and inconspicuous consultation body， 
= suddenly became a light or leading in the consensus building to pass 
!¥ this national crisis. 
2-2: Sanrokon's Condition 
Let me review the settlement condition of Sanrokon as for 
dealing with this kind of wage settlement (Enjoji et al 1981. MOL 
1993). 
Before establishing Sanrokon， MOL promised not to use this 
forum for introducing the income policy， in responding the strong 
opposition by Sohyo (GCTU)， the dominant center of labor group. 
However， both labor and business side had some strong sup. 
porters like Mr. Miyata (JFISW， IMF-JC) and Mr. Sakurada (JFEA， 
Nikkeiren) to deal with topics on the relations between wages and the 
national economy (macroeconomic policy). Therefore， after the 
meeting was once entangled by the Ohkawa Report on the matter in 
the early stage， these members succeeded in taking up this kind of 
topic， like the spring wage negotiation round into the major subjects 
of Sanrokon in 1972. 
In 1973， Mr. Miyata became the chair of IMF-JC which assured 
him a more influential voice for wage hike problem. 
After the oil shock in this year and next year， top rank officials 
of EP A such as Vice-Parliamentary Chief， Director of Research 
Bureau in EPA streneously explained the economic situation of the 
Japan. But it was not until December 1974 that the major minister 
started to attend Sanro】wn.
四2-3: The Consensus Building Process of 1975 Wage Negotiation 
ノ、
The叫 lentialprocess of c側 ensusbu仙 1
as follows: (See Shinkawa 1984， Nikkeiren 1981， Oumi 1994 in 九
1nagami et al 1994， MOL 1993， Fujita 1981) 
1n the 1974 wage negotiation round the labor side got an un. 
expected 32.9% increase in average， which was a record high and 
considered to be the first victory of Labor， for its level put up by 
Sohyo (GCTU) group (30%) and JC group (25%)， and even in compari-
son to the consumer price hikes in 1973， (11.7%) and in 1974， (23.2%). 
Immediately after the result， Mr. Fukuda， Minister of Finance in 
仕leTanaka Cabinet， proposed a research on potential effects on the 
national economy and business of the record increase in the cabinet 
Then in quoting meeting. Consequently， EP A started the research. 
the EP A's research result on the effect， he suggested the "voluntary" 
guideline method for the prospect of wage level in the Diet (May 23， 
The Hayakawa committee in LDP also proposed the same 1974). 
method (May 12， 1974). 
At the 41th meeting of Sanrokon (June 3， 1974)， the Director 
-General of the Research Bureau in EP A explained "the economic 
effect of the record wage raise on the national economy and manage-
ment in J apan." He attended Sanrokon continuously from the 41出 to
44th (June， July， September， October) meetings to explain the wage 
and prices relations. MOL made a non-statutory study group named 
"Wage守PricesProblem Round-table" as an advice group for the 
Later he ministers (August 21， 1974-， Chair Toshihiko YOSHINO. 
Sanrokon's became a member of Sam 
core members; Mr. Matsuzaki (Business， JFEA)， Mr. Miyata (Labor， 
Labor Relations of and Mr. Dosho (Director-General IMF-]C)， 
?????
?Bureau， MOL) went to Brazil and Mexico for an inspection tour 
(September 19日Z9，1974). 
At the annual meeting of the Japanese Federation of Iron and 
Steel Workers' Union on August 28， 1974， Mr. Miyata insisted "now 
is the time for change from the incremental pay-raise system on an 
annual basis，" and "we have to turn to the struggle seeking a substan. 
tive raise rather tha刀 anominal raise， inconsidering national eco. 
nomic growth in Japan". 
Mr. Amaike， the president of Domei， the J apanese Federation of 
Labor and a member of Sanrokon， expressed his support for Miyata's 
For the meantime Mr. Ohta， also a opinion on September 5th. 
Sanrokon member and ex-Sohyo (GUTU) Chair strongly opposed 
Miyata's opinion， dismissing it as yielding to the capitalist intentions 
(Sep. 18) because the labor distribution ratio in J apan were stil 
relatively low compared to those in western advanced countries. 
On the business side， Nikkeiren or JFEA set up a study group 
named "A Study Committee on the Future of the Record Wage 
Hikes" on May 20th， 1974， which included 7 businessmen of Sanro句
This Committee reported after 5 intensive meetings that in kon. 
order to maintain the high-geared growth of Japanese economy and 
peaceful sociallife， "a 15% wage hike in 1975 round and followed by 
8% in 1976， and 7% after 1977 may be an adequate guiding post." 
JFEA's Committee also emphasized the avoidance of the compulsory 
income policy， which meant government initiative as well as labor 
involvement. On the other hand， JFEA put emphasis on "voluntary" 
consultation between labor and management and declared its resolu. ??????
tion to establish this guiding post through meeting of presidents of 
Before the report， JFEA had strong solidarity member companies. 
support from al national federations， including the most influential 
organizations like Keidanren or FEO and Kansai Economic Federa. 
tion on September 1974. 
The labor national centers concluded their demand for the wage 
raise in the 1975 round around November and December 1974: Joint 
Struggle for Spring Offensive (Sohyo (GCTU) group); 30%， Domei 
Although the figures claimed by the (JFL); 27%， IMF~JC; 25% 
different groups v九rereappeared to be similar， the hidden meanings 
were revealing the uncompromising difference between two blocs; 
Sohyo (GCTU) group vs. Non-Sohyo (GCTU) private sector or Class 
Struggle faction vs. N ational Economy faction. 
Within the cabinet council， the High Prices Counter-Measure 
Cabinet Council， declared the cabinet policy goal on the upper price 
restraints to be 15% at the end of March， 1975 in comparison to出e
Here， the targeted price hikes by same month of the last year. 
government and targeted wage increase by business coincided or 
were linked in the figure司 Thismeant that， ina hidden dimension， the 
government/business coalition did engage an informal social promise 
with the private sector labor union leaders to exchange less than 15% 
price constraint by the government/business with 15% increase 
Thus 代15%"became a serious endurance by the private labor. 
mutual target zone for both sides. 
The Miki cabinet started on December 9th， 1974， succeeding the 
Mr. Fukuda became the Vice-Prime Minister and Tanaka cabinet. 
His comrade， Shun Hasegawa， returned as the the Chief of EP A. 
Fukuda's 1975 wage Minister of MOL after a one month interval. 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
round policy was "While the government will do its best to restrain 
prices， itwill not impose an income policy， and the government trusts 
and expects a consensus with wisdom between labor al1d manage-
ment concerning wage negotiatiol1s." (December 1974). 
At Sanrokon 46th meeting 011 December 18th 1974， Mr. Fukuda 
delivered an "impassioned speech" arguing for the change of the 
nature of inflation from the demand-pull type to cost-push type， to 
ask the members， especially the labor side， for cooperation with 
government policy. Fukuda sequentially aUended Sanrokon from the 
46th (December 1974) to 53th (October 1975) meetings. The prime 
minister Miki accompanied Mr. Fukuda at the February 1975 meet-
ing. Needless to say， February and March are the most important 
periods for spring offensives in the light of labor. 
The government strongly held on to the restraint policy on 
general demands such as restraints of public works. Also， itexerted 
its preference of price stabilization through the both cabinet meeting 
decision and the Economic Related Ministerial Councils led by Mr. 
Fukuda (July 23， 1974， December 17， 1974). Despite the economy was 
obviously entering into the recession period in ] anuary 1975， the 
government stuck to the high official rate (9.0%) until getting over 
the difficulty of the Shunto (wage negotiation round)， Apri116th， 1975. 
Major companies in steel industry and ship-building industry 
replied to their respective labor unions as the first runner on 9th Apri1 
in the 1975 round and the unions accepted them. The agreed-upon 
wage raise was 14.9% for steel and 15.2% for ship-building. Since 
both industries were strongest among the industries in that year， in 
addi伽 1川町 co幻 ositionsin the nationれ conomy，o伽 ir伽ー E
tries inevitably followed pay-raise level. Thus， the averaged wage 会
increase of that round turned out to be 13.9%. It was even below the 
target previonsly set by ]FEA. 
Government as well as business， especially steel industry， had 
tried to restrain price-uprise at least by March 1975， when the spring 
The prices in恥1archcould be consid-offensive reached at its peak. 
ered as a very serious criteria for the possibility of inflation in the 
year. Steel companies， pressured by other industries， had to shelve 
steel price-raise that year and promised their companies' wage 
increase lower than 15%. By their effort， prices turned out to be only 
2.0% up as for retailer prices and 10.4% up as for consumer prices in 
The governmental goal and promise was also fulfilled. 1975. 
was promised increase of "15%" the informally 1n effect， 
achieved by the three members' desperate endeavors despite the 
complicated tensions among three parties. 
As noteworthy epilogue， since the 1976 wage negotiation round， 
there has appeared the round-table consultation body on both busi-
ness and labor sides in metal and machine industries， consisting of 4 
industries and 8 major companies and their respective 8 major labor 
The Ishihata 1990). unions affiliated with 1恥lF-JC (Shinoda 1989. 
fours include steel and iron (Nippon Steel， Nihon Kokan)， ship build佃
ing (Mitsubishi Jyuko， Ishikawajima Harima Jyuko)， automobile 
production (Toyota， Nissan)， and electric machine and instruments 
(Hitachi， Toshiba). Each round-table has integrated wage standards 
in each year for both side and both of them informally negotiated 
then jointly decided upon a standard wage increase ranges; this is 
called the JC-initiative wage round by the labor side. 
??????
Thus， the increase was 8.8% in 1976， 8.8% in 1977， and 5.9% in 
1978， al of which were considered to be fallen within the adequate 
zone， set by the major parties in charge， although Sohyo (GCTU) 
groups criticized this vociferously as managed wage negotiation 
initiated by cruel and heartless capitalists and government. 
2-4: Significance and By-products of the 1975 Consensus BuiIding 
It avoided hyper-inflation The process was clearly significant. 
by moderate socially initiated guidance on pay raises and by restraint 
This of prices without compulsory income policy and price control 
Japanese way of the reciprocal consent (Samuels 1987) mechanism 
was maintained even at the time of economic crises. 
The wage increase standard for the labor side was drastically 
switched from the annual incremental method of "plus something 
more based on the preceding year performance" to the刊adequate
wage increase in considering the economic growth and maintenance 
of substantial income." 
By turn， this change has assured the adequate economic growth 
and has encouraged the structural change of Japanese economy 
without reducing the employment level as a whole throughout the 
late 1970's and 1980's. 
The side effect was that， systemic transformation has become to 
occur at the national and industrial levels of industrial relations and 
even in the policy process itself. 
As observed earlier， the cooperative labor representatives overt. 
ly demanded more formal and substantial participation in the policy 
At the same time， they process of advisory councils etc. in return. 
??????
also claimed a variety of policy actions in order to maintain the ful 
employment system even under the harsh circumstances. 
The business side has become very cooperative in promoting 
such policy actions by government with the private labor leaders. 
They conceded their posts in the advisory councils for labor (the 
percentage of business in the advisory councils declined from 27.9% 
in 1973 to 22.7% in 1988， while that of labor slightly increased from 
3.6% to 4.3%. This is more articulate in the councils related to 
economic affairs (Tsujinaka 1994). 
Consequently， a variety of corporative policies supported by both 
labor and business were embodied in a law and budgetary plans. For 
instance， a lot of laws concerning counter-measures for the local 
-industry depressed area (1978-83)， and for the structural1y depressed 
industries， (1977-83)， the employment security for such areas and for 
such industries (1983， 87， 88)， the revision of the Health Insurance Law 
(1986)， and making new systems for human resource development 
promotions (1985， 88)， for equal opportunity and for the handicapped 
(1987) and for senior workers (1986)， etc (Nakamura 1988: 27-29， 32 
-35). 
As a political by-product， having gained confidence， policy 
means and personnel network for information through Sanrokon and 
other related organizations， the private labor union leaders have 
formulated their way of activity as the "Policy-Institution Demand 
Strategy，" which became a strong alternative form of leverage 
against Sohyo (GCTU)'s political campaign strategy (Tsujinaka 1994. 
Shinoda 1989). They created their forum named Policy-Institution 
Promotion Council in 1976. This became a core organization， bring-
2i昭 otherunions into their movem倒 policyand finally in the late 
~ 1980s they reunified the labor sector into Rengo， the ]apanese Trade 
ハ UnionConfederation by their initiative. This kind of reunification 
itself is very rare in the advanced industrial countries (Tsujinaka 
1994). 
This private union group eventually became a friendly， however 
low profile， partner to carry out a series of reforms such as adminis-
trative， budgetary， tax and political reforms， throughout the 1980s 
(Oumi 1994). 
Therefore， the harsh political contests in the high economic 
growth era had been replaced by putting up battle over chances for 
structural change and 
Shinoda 1989). Oumi's article. 
participation and consultation under the 
globalization (Inagami 1994， esp‘ 
Analysis 1: Organization Structure and Representation of 3 
Sanrokon 
The most distinctive and important characteristic of Sanrokon 
regarding structure is its quasi-formal status as a non-statutory 
There is an interest-advisory committee for the Minister of Labor. 
ing contrast between the impressive titles of each member and the 
Even Ichiro KA TO， the committee's low publicity among people. 
current chairperson confessed "1 myself did not know of the existence 
of Sanrokon where such influential figures of labor and management 
got together regularly， before my participation. Thus the man in the 
street does not aware of its existence， just like me." (MOL 1993: p. 
4)， The mass media in general， even specialized papers like the ]apan 
??????
Labor News， have not put efforts to cover Sanrokon meeting so 
much. 
3-1: Structure and Composition of Sanrokon 
Sanrokon is by name， supposed to be a tripartite body. But 
precisely speaking， so-called "the Guideline" did deny the character-
istic of a tripartite body because MOL resists to render up its 
Moreover， itconsists of four appointment authority to each sector. 
types of actors: labor union leaders， business and employers' associa-
tion leaders， academic scholars and intellectuals， and government 
officials. In fact， Sanrokon has been a quartet or a quat-partite body 
organization (See table 3 and talbe 4). 
The Government-side is the host， consisting mainly of the 
Minister and more than 20 senior bureaucrats from the Ministry of 
Labor but also incIudes some officials from the Economic Planning 
Agency. UsuaIIy， every other meeting invites a guest speaker from 
outside of MOL. 
The A neutral side consists of academics and inteIIectuals. 
number of its members is the half of the both labor and business sides. 
Regard-The expected role is a moderator and professional advisor. 
less of the side they took， many members recalled how important Mr. 
N akayama's role as the chairperson was between 1970 and 1980， thus 
these academics were reliable intermediator. 
Although it was not always so， the number of members from 
labor and business side had been almost equivalent， as the table 3 
shows. 
3-2: Representativeness of Sanrokon 
??????
Sanrokon is neither a representative committee nor a rigid 
Yet， itis meant to represent most influential tripartite system. 
Table 2-A， 2-B and table organizations in both business and labor. 
3 indicate that there are al the cream of the crop in Sanrokon. These 
members， especially from business side have been serving as chair 
Table 2-A Original member of Sanrokon (1970. 1) 
(お1inistryof Labor 1993: 45-49) 
Labor side 
OHT A Kaoru President of J apanese Federation of Synthetic 
Chemistry Industry Workers Unions (Goka Roren) 
OHYA Tetsutaro General Secretary of N ational Federation of 
1ndustrial Organizations (Shinsanbetsu) 
OKA加1URAKei General Secretary of Federation of 1ndependent 
Unions of Japan (Churitsu Roren) 
K1YOT A Hirosuke President of All Japan Federation of Electri司
cal Machine W orkers' Unions (Denki Roren) 
SH1GEEDA Takumi General Secretary of Japanese Federation 
of Labor (Domei) 
T AKIT A Minoru President of J apanese Federation of Labor 
(Domei) 
MINAMIHAZAMA Yutaka 
Union 
HARAGUCH1 Yukitaka 
Union (Zenko) 
HORII Toshikatsu President of General Council of Trade Unions 
of Japan (Sohyo) 
MIY A T A Y oshiji President of J apanese Federation of 1ron and 
Steel W orkers' Union (Tekko Roren) 
MIY ANOHARA Sadamitsu Pr己sidentof Japan Teachers Union 
Employer side 
ANZA1 Hiroshi 
SUNANO Hitoshi 
1MAZATO Hir叫d
ing Co.， Ltd 
KA W AMAT A Katsuji President of Nissan Motor Co.， Ltd. 
K1KA W ADA Kazutaka Chairman of Association of Corporation 
Executive (Keizai Doyukai). 
President of The Tokyo Electric Power Co.， 1nc. 
SAKURADA Takeshi President of Japan Federation 
Employers Association (Nihon Keieisha Dantai Renmei) 
ST AO Senju President of Senju Metal 1ndustri巴s，Ltd. 
SHINOSH1MA Hideo President of Mitsubishi Chemical 1ndus-
President of All Japan Seamen's 
President of All Japan Mining Workers 
President of Tokyo Gas Corp. 
Chairman of Kawasaki Heavy 1ndustri巴s，Ltd. 
President of The Nihon Mining & Concentrat-
??
?
? ? ?
of 
tries， Ltd. 
DOKO Toshio 
tion 
NAGANO Shigeo President ()f Federation of Chambers ()f Com-
m己rceand Industrv 
HA Y AKA W A Masaru Executive Directof of J apan Federatiot1 
of Employers Associatiol1 
Academic side 
ARISA WA Hiromi Professor Emeritus of University of Tokyo 
ISHII Teruhisa President of Central Labor Relations Commission 
EBA T A Kiyoshi Chief Editor of Asahi Shinbun Publishing Co. 
EN]OJI Jiro President of Nihon Keizai Shinbun Inc. 
N AKA Y AMA Ichiro Presid巴ntof J apan Institute of Labor 
President of Tokyo Shibaura Electronics Corpora-
?????
?
Table 2-B Current member of Sanrokon (1995. 1) 
(Ministry of Labor. Material.) mimeo. 
??????
Labor side 
ASHIDA Jinnosuke President of ]apanese Trade Union Confeder-
ation (Rengo). President of ]apanese Federation of Textile， 
Garment， Chemical， Distributive， and Allied Industry W orkers' 
Unions (Zensen Domei) 
IKEMURA Ryoichi President of General Federation of Private 
Railway Workers' Unions of ]apan (Shitetsu Soren) 
ITO恥1ototaka President of Japan Postal Workers' Union (Zentei) 
IW A Y Al¥1A Yasuo Presic1ent of All ] apan Fec1eration of Electri町
cal Machine W orkers'じnions(Denki Roren) 
KA]IMOTO Koji President of Federation of Information anc1 
Telecommunication Inc1ustry (J oho Roren) 
KA W AO Y otaro Presic1ent of National Fec1eration of Life Insur-
ance Workers Unions (Seiho Roren) 
KA WACHIY AMA Daisaku President of ]apan巴seConfederation 
of Chemical and General Trade Unions (Zenka Rengo) 
! GOTO乱10rishige Deputy President of Japan己seTrade Union 
Confederation (Rengo). 
President of Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers Unions 
(Zen Nihon ]ichidantai Rodo Kumiai) 
SASAMORI Kiyoshi President of Confederation of Electric 
Power-related Industry Workers' Unions of ]apan (Denryoku 
Soren) 
TOKUl¥10TO Teruhito President of Confederation of ]apan 
Automobile Workerぜ Unions(Jidosha Soren) 
NAKANISHI Shojiro President of All ]apan Seamens Union 
(Kaiin Kumiai) 
l¥1AEKA W A Tadao General President of J apan Council of Metal 
Workers' Union (Kinzoku Rokyo) 
WASHIO Etsuya Secretary of ]apanese Trade Union Confedera-
tion (Rengo) 
Employer side 
INABA Kosaku President of Federation of Chambers of Com-
merce and Industry (Nihon Shoko Kaigisho). President of Ishik日
awajima-Harima Heavy Industries Co.， Ltd. 
IOSHI Kazuo President of The Mitsubishi Bank， Ltd 
KANAMORI Shigeichiro Pr号sidentof Kinki Nihon R呂ilwayCo.， 
Ltd. 
KUME Yutaka Chairperson of Nissan Motor Co.， Ltd. 
SAITO Yu President of Nippon Steel Corporation 
SUZUKI Kazuo Counselor of Toppan Printing Co.， Ltd. 
SEKIMOTO Tadahiro President of Nippon Electric Co.， Ltd. 
TSUTSUMI Seiji President of Saison Corporation 
TOYODA Shoichiro President of ]apan Federation of Economic 
Organizations (Keidanren). President of Toyota Motor Co.， Ltd. 
NAGANO Ken President of ]apan Federation of Employers 
Association (Nihon Keieisha Dantai Renmei) 
HA Y AMI Suguru Execl1tive Director of ] apanese Association of 
Corporation Execl1tive (Keizai DOYl1kai). COl1nselor of Nissho 
-Iwai Co.， Ltd. 
FUKUOKA Michio Execl1tive Director of ]apan Federation of 
Employers' Associations (Nikkeir巴n)
MIMURA Y ohei Counselor of Mitsubishi Corporation 
Academic side 
ISHIKA W A Kichiemon 
(Chairperson) 
KA TO Ichiro President of Seijo Gakl1en， Professor Emeritus of 
Tokyo University 
T AKAHARA Sumiko Economy Critic 
TSU]IMURA Kotaro President of ]apan Labor Organization， 
Professor Emeritus of Keio Gijiku University 
MA TSUY AMA Y l1kio Friend of Asahi Shinbin Pl1blishing Co. 
MIY AZAKI Isao Chairperson of Daiwa Research Institute Corp. 
YOSHINO Toshihiko Special Advisor of Economic Research 
Institl1te of Yamaichi Securities Co.， Ltd 
Professor Emeritl1s of Tokyo Univ.巴rsity
??????
Table 3 Change of Number of Members from Each Side 
Members 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
A Labor side 
1 (11) 
Number 
1 12 12 13 13 
B Emp!oyer side 
Number 
1 1 12 13 12 13 
C Academic side 
Number 
5 5 7 8 8 7 
ーー 四ーー .-・ー ーー 司許 F帯曲+樺『・幽件直ー 由ー民ー ーー ーー -----，・曹司自由冒---------四四------岨晶------_静品目戸ー 崎直日ー 目ー_---
A Labor side by national center 
Sohyo 4 4 5 4 (4) *村 ( 5 ) 
Domei 3 3 3 3 (3) (3) 
Cyuritu 2 2 2 2 (3) (2) 
Sinsanbetsu 1 。 1 1 
]C 1 1 1 1 (1) (1) 
Rengo 1 * 2 ** 2 
* Rengo's former body Zenminrokyo (]apanese Private Sector Trade 
Union Counci!)， formed in 1982. 
* * Rengo ]apanese Trade Union Confederation， first formed as pri戸
vat巴 sectornationa! center in 1987 and reorganized as a private 
public sector center in 1989. 
* * * Since1989， aIl!abor-side member were recruited from Rengo. 
These memb巴rsin parenthese indicate ex-affiIation of members. 
-persons or key members in many prestigious advisory committees 
and non-statutory study groups across the many other ministries and 
agencies (Fujita 1981). Such commiUees and councils include Indus-
trial Structure Council， Economic Council， Tax Commission， Advi-
sory Council on Social Security， Advisory Council on the Public 自
F、
Service Personnel System， Financial System Research Council and 函
Employment Council. Especially， through the 1980's the administra-
tive reform had been discussed in the Provisional Council for Admin-
istrative Reform and its related councils. All chairpersons were 
recruited from Sanrokon members， which means they were recruited 
Government司SideAttendance (Regular) 
A: Ministry of Labor 
Minister of Labor 
Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Labor 
Administrative Vice叩Ministerof Labor 
Assistant-Minister of Labor for International Affairs 
Deputy Vice-Minister for Administration 
Director-General of Policy Planning and Research Department 
Director of General Affairs Coordination Division 
Director of Finance Division 
Director-General of Labor Relations Bureau 
Director-General of Worker's Welfare Department 
Director of Labor Relations Division (Secretariat of the 
Sanrokan) 
Director-General of Labor Standards Bureau 
Director-General of W omen's Bureau 
Director-General of Employment Security Bureau 
Director of Measures for the Aged and the Disabled Depart-
ment 
Director-General of Human Resources Development Bureau 
Secretary-General of Central Labor Relations Commission 
Ministerial Councilors (4) 
B: Economic Planning Agency 
Administrative Vice-Minister 
Director-General of Coordination Bureau 
Table 4 
from Keidanren， FEu-
In this sense， besides Sanrokon members are representatives of 
national labor and business， they also directly and/or indirectly 
??????
reflect most of the important advisory and policy research councils_ 
Sanrol王oncan work as a real elites' forum for the kingpins of policy 
making in J apan_ 
3-3: Selection Procedure for Members and Secretariat for Sanro・
kon 
Since Sanrokon is an advisory committee for the Minister of 
Labor， the appointment authority is attached to the Minister and the 
The officials in charge， however， have to secretariat of Sanrokon. 
consult informally with major organizations in advance to select and 
recruit new members. The most important point to which they must 
be attentive to is to keep the balance of power among members and 
a good atmosphere to have a heart-to-heart talk with members and 
organizations represented. 
The Secretariat service is conducted by the Labor Relations 
Bureau， Labor Relations Division. It consists of the Director， Deputy 
Director and Section Chief in the division. 
Analysis II: Issue， Agenda and Procedure for Discussion at 4 
Sanrokon 
Please see table 7: Content of Sanrokon Discussion 
The outline claims the subject of general labor problem and 
As can be seen in Table 7， there is a wide related industry problem. 
Almost al are variety of topics tabled for discussion at Sanrokon. 
??????
discussed at the morning breakfast table. 1n fact， ittends to be rather 
highly articulate there. 
4-1: Included Topics and Emphasized Issues 
Primary topics and subjects are related to employment， prices， 
economic forecast and current situations， wages， and counter-reces-
sion measures. They are more or less possitively related to the labor 
Table 5 Guest Attendants (Minister Class) 
The number 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 。ftimes 70…74 74-80 80-87 87-
Prime Minister 。Vice Prime Minister 
(Director-General of EPA) 
Director-General of Economic 32(42) Planning Agency 
Other Minister level ; 
Minister of International Trade 
and Industry り
Minister of Finance 4 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 3 
Minister of Transport 2 
Minister for Agriculture， 
Forestry， and Fisheries 
Director-General of the 
National Land Agency 
Director-General of the Admin-
istrative Manag巴n淀川 Ag巴ncy “ 
The Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Minister of State 
(special mission) 
Director-General of Adminis-
trative Affairs in the Prime 0 
Minister's Office 
Minister of Health and Welfar巴
Minister of Education 
Director-General of Sci日nceand 
Technology Agency 
Director-General of Environ-
ment Agency 
President of the N ational 
Personnel Agency 
Chair of Provisional Committee 噌
on Administrative Reform • 
Governor of the Bank of ]apan 3 
Secretary of Labor of the 
United States 
The United States' Ambassador 守
to ]apan ム
四
四
四
六 Total
20 
10 
2 
2 
。
1 
。。
4 
???
?
?
????
。
?
??
?
。
6 
10 
11 
??
?? ? ? ?
。
。
。
l 
円 7 
0 
s 8 
? ?
?
???
??
??
??
??
??
1 
1 
0 
???
??
l 。
1 
1 
1 
0 1 
21 96 6 36 33 
SANROKON Meeting Frequencies 
4 the number 
of the atten-
dance of 
Prim巴 Min-
ister 
3 Average 
interval of 
the confer-
ence nu口1-
ber/length 
of the 
cabinet 
22 
2 the number 
of time by a 
cabinet 
Table 6 
1 the number 
of times by 
fiscal year 
。41.7 Sato 
。38.5 23 Tanaka 
43.9 17 Miki 
3 35.7 20 Fukuda 
2 39.2 15 Ohira 
2 
5 
???????
2 
?
? ? 。 ，
?
??????87.3 
65.0 
(61.7) 
3 
( 3 ) 
Hosokawa 
Hata 
Murayama 
?
?
??
?
? ?
????
????
?????????
????????
???
? ?
??
?
45.5 
42.9 
57.4 
34.0 
51.1 
53.3 
? ?
?
?
???
??????
??????
? ?
???
?
???????
?
?
? 、
??
??
?
?
?
?? ?
?
??
19 
42 
Suzuki 
Nakasone 
10 
》??
? ?
?
?
???
? ， ょ
Takeshita 
Uno 
Kaifu 
Miyazawa 
Since the 1975 wage negotiation round described in market policy. 
the case study， the topics of economic forecasts and current economic 
conditions have become conventionally reported by officials of EPA : 
prices， inflatiol1， economIc growth， cunでl1qぅexchangerate， and 
finance problem etc.， topics concerning macroeconomics. 
It some-The range of issue seems to have widened over time. 
times covers diplomacy and political reforms to some extent. Almost 
al important political issues reported by the Minister of Labor， the 
ministers in charge or even the Prime Minister himself， are freely 
discussed there. 
4-2: Excluded Topics or Un-emphasized Issues 
Among labor policies. some typical matters like collective bar-
gaining， employment， labor， and working conditiol1s， and discrimina-
tion problems were tabled for discussion very few times there. 
Fundamental labor rights problems of the public sector workers was 
once discussed just after a historical strike on N ovember 1975 (54th 
meeting)， but this sort of thing is exceptional. Labor condition issues 
were touched upon in relation to other issues， such as the multi 
?? ?-national corporation problem and the equal rights law， etc. 
addition， social policies， social securities and welfare topics were 
hardly mentioned since the Ministry of Hea1th and Welfare， not MOL 
??????
is in charge of these items. 
Consequently， Sanrokon's agenda and issues seem to be limited 
to the areas in which conflicts could be considered negotiable and， 
thereafter could be agreed upon from the macro point of view in 
terms of national economic policies， orthe topics which are favorable 
???〈????『
??
??????
叱コ
??????
??? ?
?????????????
?
??「??????????
???
?
?????
??? ????????
?
? ?
?
?
?? ????『 ???????????」??
?? ?
?
???
??
?
1期 l
70/1~ I 
74/]] 
3 
つ
3 
9 
8 
6 
3 
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?
???????
?
?
?
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?
?
?
?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ??
?
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?
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?
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??? ??????
?
?????????
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?
???????Table 7 
o 
1 
0 
4 
。
1 
12 
???
?
。
?
???
?
。。
I 
ー ?
?????
6 
0 
1 
3 
?
??
??
?
， ? ? ?
?
????
????
??
??
?
???
? ?
??
?
????
，?
??
?
??
守
13 
6 
a) Management of Conference 
b) Domestic Politics/Foreign Affairs 
c) Economic Forecast/Economic Situation 
d) Currency Problem/Exchange Rate 
e) Financial Conditions 
f) Energy. Oil 
g) Productivity/Statistical Problem 
h) Industrial Structure 
i) Prices/Public Services' Fee 
j) Wages 
k) Spring Offensive 
1) Employm巴nt
m) Foreign W orker Problem/Vocational 
Training 
n) U nemployment Insurance 
。)Counter measure against Recession 
p) Housing and Land Probl巴m/theProperty 
-making System for Workers 
q) Retirement Age 
r) Reduction in Working Hours 
s) Tax System/Reduction of Tax 
t) Multinational Corporation 
u) Administrative f，(eform 
v) Others 
(沙盟)Oillill 
for general discussion， like the current political task by the cabinet 
and the explanation of foreign and domestic affairs. 
In this sense Sanrokon is not the specialized policy council for 
labor problem but rather the general advisory organ for the cabinet， 
whose members are recruited from the top elite of labor， business and 
academics. 
4-3: Sanrokon's Operating Procedure 
Frequencies of Meeting 
Please see the table 6: Sanrokon's孔1eetingFrequencies 
The Outline says "as occasion demands， he or she convene a 
forum to ask their opinion on related policy matters." There is no 
exact rule of the schedule， but they have regularly met once a month， 
except for the period of spring wage negotiation and during summer. 
However it was often cancelled when too inconvenient for the 
Minister of Labor or other senior bureaucrats， or for the Cabinet. 
Recently， the volatile political climate has seemed to reduce the 
session of the meetings. 
N otice of meeting 
Two to three weeks before a meeting， the notice is delivered to 
For each member by the secretariat by the name of the Minister. 
some reason， the aUendance is said to be very high， close to full. This 
? ? ? ? ? ?
?high attendance is an exceptional case for other meetings and coun-
cils. 
Agenda Setting 
In reviewing matters for meeting discussion and consulting with 
a guest speaker， the secretariat sets up the agenda and the Minister 
The materials are usually provided by the guest has to approve it司
speakers. 
Since 1974，代MonthlyCurrent Economic lndexes" by EP A has 
This been delivered and explained by the EP A officials in charge. 
material includes the indexes as follows: 1 N ational Income Statis白
tics (GDP， Import and Export etc.); 2 lndividual Consumption， Com‘ 
mercial Sales; 3 Residence Construction，; 4 Civil Capital Invest-
ment， Amount of Civil Order; 5 Public W ork Investment; 6 Manu向
Stock; 7 Shipping， Production， Mining and Industry facturing 
Employment Situation， Rate of Job Hunting/Job Offering， Unemploy-
ment Rate; 8 Corporation Profit， Survey on Corporation Perfor-
mance; 9 Corporation Bankruptcy; 10 Import and Export Statis-
tics; 11 Current Account of Balance of Payment; 12 Prices; 13 
Finance， Stock Market Statistics; 12 Foreign Countries' Economic 
These indexes cover generally 5 years. Statistics. 
Time Schedule 
Ordinary Sanrokon meeting is held as following schedule ; 
Opening at 8; 30 A. M. (serving breakfast) 
1; Minister of Labor delivers address. 
2; Topics Presentation by the Guest Speaker 
3; Discussion on the Topics. 
??????
4; Explanation on the Current Economic Situation by EP A Official 
in Charge 
Closing at before 10; 00 A. M. 
This kind of morning breakfast meeting becomes a very common 
practice for the political elites in J apan. 
Reporting Relations 
There are no reporting relations， because it is a non-statutory 
advisory committee for the Minister of Labor， and al related ofi-
It is said "to be closed" and there are no cials in MOL attend it 
minutes and records for the meetings. 
There is no custom of replying to the request from the minister. 
Sanrokon publicized its report and proposal concerning prices only 
three times between 1979 and 1981. 
After the meeting， atthe press conference， the Director-General 
of Labor Relations Bureau conducts a briefing but does not mention 
the individual names with regard to the opinions， but only referring 
to anonymous opinions of each side. 
Analysis III: Factors Strengthening or Weakening Sanro・w u 
kon's Consultation 
It must be a consciousness of "need" among parties in concern 
that strengthens a national tripartite consultative mechanism. 
This consciousness should be coincidentaly felt among three 
parties or four parties. There initiative and leadership plays a crucial 
In the case of Sanrokon，恥lasaorole to promote the formation. 
Matsunaga， Director-General of Labor Relations Bureau， Y oshiji 
Miyata for the labor side， Takeshi Sakurada for the business side 
??????
among others， especially Ichiro N akayama from academics， perfor-
med a decisive role. 
In the development of Sanrokon， the attitude of the Cabinet was 
As was elaborated in section 1-B， Mr. Fukuda， vice 
-prime minister in the Miki Cabinet， took a pivotal position to up 
also crucial. 
-grade Sanrokon as a substantial advisory organ for the cabinet in 
1975. Therefore， leaders attitudes， especially that of the Prime 
lVIinister， has had significance in it， as shown by lVIr. Fukuda and lVIr. 
Nakasone. 
In general， itis said that maintenances of a tripartite body is 
easier if there is a high degree of integration among peak organiza-
tions of business and labor. In the case of ]apan， however the both 
sectors， especially the labor sector， were terribly fragmented by 
nature having four national centers and hundreds of industrial confed噂
erations and federations. Yet， such dispersed situation made it more 
substantially necessary for labor leaders to attend Sanrokon. This 
eventually led to， as noted above， the second reunification movement 
since 1976. 
On the other hand， which factors weaken Sanrokon? 
Needless to say， ifmajor actors between labor and business are 
at odds， or if actors in the same sector begin inner conflict， the 
Sanrokon-like body inevitably becomes weakened. These have been 
some sources of conflicts and confrontation among them， such as 
famous administrative reform problems， including especially the 
privatization of the major public sector industries of National Rail-
ways， Telecommunications， and Tobacco. However， itseems the 
secretariat has successfully avoided such issues or has carefully 四
presented such matters. 
Only one factor which can be noted is that the relative weight of 
labor problems and the necessity of mutual consultation have been 
gradually reduced. This is because of the "success" of informal 
institutionalization of national industrial relations through Sanrokon， 
ム
/¥ 
五
or of the success of attaining growth in cooperative and corporative 
labor partners， which is evidenced by the reunification of the labor 
sector by Rengo (J apanese Trade Union Confederation) in 1989. This 
is true in terms of pure consultation or information-sharing， and 
Now， sharing mutual trusts beyond differences through Sanrokon. 
yet， inthe 1990's， having to face more of global transformation in 
every aspect， more general policy oriented consultation might be 
increasingly necessary in J apan. 
Conclusion: Function and Contribution of Sanrokon 6 
Let me reiterate the gist of Sanrokon's function and its contribu蜘
tion to consensus building and social stability and development (see 
Fujita 1981). 
First of al， Sanrokon has provided a forum for information 
sharing as well as jointly recognizing problems. It should have been 
There were many opportunities to more precious for the labor side. 
receive presentations to be informed economic indexes， concept 
definitions and theories， especially the relations between wages and 
Consequently the wage demands at the spring round by pnces. 
different national centers and groups have begun to converge since 
1980. 
??????
Secondly， ithas been a good place for al participants to express 
their frank opinions to government officials， including the Prime 
It can be said that it was an Minister and Minister of Labor. 
exceptional case to have a such opportunity. 
Thirdly， by turn， the government， especially the MOL can get 
immediate feedbaeJ王 throughfrank opinions and straightforward 
reactions by the top leaders in the both labor and business sectors 
It is also very rare and towards governmental policies and plan. 
Most of the major reports by other advisory precious for thern. 
councils and non-statutory policy research committees in MOL were 
introduced or presented to know their reactions. 
Fourthly， when the both sector leaders agree on some iterns， they 
can irnrnediately ask the government about that matter. Such items 
counter-public pol1ution rneasure include extension of retiring age， 
by MOL， stabilization of employrnent， tax reduction， residence con・
struction increase， counter-measures against recession and price 
stabilization. 
As was rnentioned earlier， these participants are also key actors 
Therefore once and serve as chairs in many prestigious councils 
issues are discussed at Sanrokon， the thoughts articulated there could 
Thus， prevail or influence the issues of other related councils. 
Sanr叫<onfunctions as a cornprehensive advisory body for major 
As a corollary， This would be a fifth function industrial policies. 
governments try to utilize this hidden function. 
This intention can be evidenced by the case of administrative 
reform， the rnost drastic and critical policy issues in the political ??????
scene in the 1980's which were discussed in the late 1970's before they 
became real issue. 
Finally Sanrokon has been precious in providing a place for 
communication in the same sector. Labor union leaders belonging to 
different (sometirne rnutually confrontational) national peak organi-
zations could not cornrnunicate with each other without Sanrokon at 
least in the 1970's. Or at least it was very difficult for them and even 
for business leaders to do so. 
Thus， only Sanrokon has been functioning as the intermediary 
mechanism at the nationallevel. This function has facilitated overall 
structural change of industry and economy from the 1970's to 1990's. 
As an important episode， there have appeared several coopera. 
tive organizations as a result of the agreement reached by discussions 
at Sanrokon. For instance， N ational Social Economic Council was 
organized in 1973 supported by many of Sanrokon members in the 
private sector whose chairperson was Ichiro N akayama， who was the 
chair of Sanrokon at that time. Multinational Companies Labor 
Liaison Conference， as J apan Overseas Enterprise Association for the 
business side was set up. And Labor Union Council for Multinational 
Corporation Problem for the labor side was established in the mid 
-1970's through the agreement at Sanrokon (21th， 36th， and 38th 
meetings). 
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